Interim Prime Minister: A Model to Break the Deadlock in Thai Politics

Wallop Phumra
Institute of Human Rights and Peace Studies, Mahidol University

Following a unanimous decision by the Constitutional Court to accept a petition from the President of the Senate—forwarded on behalf of 36 senators—requesting the Court to rule whether the premiership of Ms. Paetongtarn Shinawatra has ended under Section 170, paragraph one (4) in conjunction with Sections 160 (4) and (5) of the Constitution, the Court ordered her to cease performing her duties as Prime Minister from July 1, 2025, until a final ruling is delivered (Thai PBS, 2025).

This prompted questions about whether Ms. Paetongtarn’s role as Minister of Culture would also be affected, as the senators’ petition targeted her status as a minister—encompassing both the premiership and ministerial post. However, Mr. Wissanu Krea-ngam, former Deputy Prime Minister and former Cabinet Secretary-General, clarified that the Constitutional Court had not ruled her ministerial status terminated, but had only ordered her to cease her duties as Prime Minister (The Bangkok Insight, 2025). Similarly, iLAW stated that Ms. Paetongtarn’s status as a minister remains valid. However, should the Court rule that her premiership has indeed ended, it would immediately transform the political landscape. The entire Cabinet would be dismissed, triggering a process whereby the House of Representatives must select a new Prime Minister from the previously submitted party nominee lists (iLAW, 2025).

Although the Court has yet to issue a verdict, political movements have already begun. The opposition alliance, newly joined by Bhumjaithai Party, convened at Parliament to discuss joint strategies. The real highlight, however, was the closed-door discussion between Mr. Natthaphong Ruangpanyawut, leader of the People’s Party, and Mr. Anutin Charnvirakul, leader of Bhumjaithai Party. Speculation has arisen that the People’s Party may support Mr. Anutin as Prime Minister, particularly given prior rumors of behind-the-scenes coordination between the two parties proposing Mr. Anutin for the top post (BBC NEWS Thai, 2025). Nevertheless, both Mr. Anutin and Mr. Natthaphong denied the rumors. Mr. Anutin firmly rejected the idea from the beginning, stating that neither he nor his party had ever approached the People’s Party (Kammakorn Khao, 2025). Mr. Natthaphong added that while he and Mr. Anutin, including other party leaders, had not held discussions on the matter, informal conversations among party members were normal (PPTV HD 36, 2025).

This represents a significant political scenario that has attracted wide attention. Should the current Prime Minister be removed by Constitutional Court ruling—or resign before such a decision is made—an election for a new Prime Minister would inevitably follow. In this context, the “Interim Prime Minister” model proposed by the People’s Party as a political way out has sparked renewed interest. The proposal includes seven key points:

The People’s Party believes that what the country needs most is a stable government with political legitimacy, trusted by the public, and capable of forming an executive team based on merit, not political bargaining.
The People’s Party believes that such a government cannot emerge from the current parliamentary equation. Therefore, the solution is to hold “new elections” promptly to form a legitimate and effective government.
The People’s Party affirms that the most straightforward path to new elections is for the acting Prime Minister to declare their intention to use existing powers to dissolve Parliament and return power to the people through an election.
If the acting Prime Minister refuses to take this course and if Ms. Paetongtarn Shinawatra is removed from office, the process of selecting a new Prime Minister must ensure the individual is committed to dissolving Parliament.
The People’s Party reiterates its stance to remain in opposition until new elections are held. However, to avoid a political deadlock or undemocratic power play, the party is willing to vote for any Prime Ministerial candidate who accepts the “condition” of being a temporary government with the sole mission of dissolving Parliament. The People’s Party will not join the government or hold any ministerial positions.
The “conditions” for advancing toward a parliamentary dissolution must include at least:

6.1. Declaring a deadline to dissolve Parliament by the end of the year.

6.2. Committing to completing urgent tasks within that timeframe (e.g., organizing a referendum alongside the election to ask the public about forming a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution, resolving the immediate Thai – Cambodian dispute, and ensuring that essential budget allocations for economic stimulus and livelihood issues are not disrupted by elections).

Should any individual accept these “conditions” but fail to honor them, the People’s Party will use all 142 of its MPs and every parliamentary mechanism to bring down a government that breaks its promise to the people immediately (People’s Party, 2025).

Mr. Natthaphong, the party leader, emphasized that these seven points were not aimed at any specific individual or party. The purpose of presenting this position was to communicate to the public that the country need not face a political impasse. If it becomes impossible to elect a new Prime Minister, the People’s Party is willing to use its 142 votes to help break the deadlock (Matichon Online, 2025).

However, this proposal is expected to be unviable in practice. Assistant Professor Suwicha Pao-aree, Director of NIDA Poll, argues that no parties would ultimately join the model, and the People’s Party alone lacks the votes to support a Prime Ministerial candidate. He believes that the Pheu Thai Party is likely to engage in behind-the-scenes lobbying to nominate a Prime Minister before the Constitutional Court delivers its ruling (PPTV HD 36, 2025).

References

Thai PBS. (2025, July 1). Constitutional Court accepts petition to remove “Paetongtarn”; orders suspension from PM duties. Retrieved from Thai PBS: https://www.thaipbs.or.th/news/content/353787

The Bangkok Insight. (2025, July 3). Wissanu affirms Paetongtarn can still take oath as Minister of Culture. Retrieved from The Bangkok Insight: https://today.line.me/th/v3/article/EX92Gpa

iLaw. (2025, July 1). Court orders PM to suspend duties; government and parliament still functioning. Retrieved from iLaw: https://www.ilaw.or.th/articles/53002

BBC NEWS Thai. (2025, July 3). Bhumjaithai–People’s Party float “interim PM” formula—Who gains or loses, and is it feasible? Retrieved from BBC NEWS Thai: https://www.bbc.com/thai/articles/cew0ndy9qw7o

Sorayuth Suthassanachinda (Kamnakorn Khao). (2025, July 2). “Anutin” denies interim PM rumors, says “We’ll talk about PM later”—rejects secret talks with “Teng”. Retrieved from Sorayuth Suthassanachinda Facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/sorrayuth9115/posts/อนุทิน-ปฏิเสธข่าวเสนอตัวนั่งนายกฯ-ชั่วคราว-ลั่น-นายกฯ-หนู-ค่อยว่ากัน-รอให้ถึงวัน/1351460386340897/

PPTV HD 36. (2025, July 4). Highlight | Teng Natthaphong discusses “interim PM” with Anutin behind closed doors | Open News Desk. Retrieved from PPTV HD 36: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JyqLAA51Qrk

People’s Party. (2025, July 3). The People’s Party’s position on finding a national solution if PM Paetongtarn is removed. Retrieved from https://www.facebook.com/PPLEThai/posts/-จุดยืนพรรคประชาชนต่อการหาทางออกสำหรับประเทศ-หากนายกฯ-แพทองธารพ้นตำแหน่ง-ท่ามกลา/122159944946480817/

Matichon Online. (2025, July 4). Teng denies targeting anyone for interim PM; emphasizes conditions and exclusion of outsiders—Complex laws must not return to parliament. Retrieved from: https://www.matichon.co.th/politics/news_5260711PPTV HD 36. (2025, July 6). NIDA Poll Director believes interim PM model is unlikely to materialize | Evening News. Retrieved from PPTV HD 36: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=727536926689011